Using survey data from a random sample of the Michigan adult population, we investigate the relationship between individuals' perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination, and their preferences regarding a wide variety of public policies.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination, and the effects of these perceptions on policy preferences, using data from a survey of a random sample of Michigan adults. We hypothesize that individuals' policy preferences are shaped by their perceptions of the degree and nature of economic inequality, even when we control for ideology and other potentially relevant factors.
We argue that these perceptions affect preferences toward policies that are substantially economic in nature, such as cash assistance for the poor: People who perceive high levels of inequality will be more likely to favor active government measures to reduce inequality, especially if the inequality is perceived as being due to discrimination. Similarly, those who perceive lower levels of inequality, and/or who believe that such inequality results from inherent differences among people (rather than from discrimination), will be more likely to oppose active government measures to reduce those inequalities, and may prefer policies that have the effect of increasing existing inequalities.
Our approach is similar to that of Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and La Ferrara (2000, 2002) , who explore the roles of personal and attitudinal factors and policy context on support for redistributive policies. However, our work differs from theirs in three major respects.
First, our study extends beyond preferences for redistribution. We examine the ways in which perceptions of economic inequality and discrimination shape preferences on a wide range of public policies, including some issues that are not narrowly economic in nature. Second, we incorporate political ideology explicitly. We estimate the marginal effect of perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination, controlling for selfreported ideology. Third, we investigate the extent to which the degree of polarization influences the relationships between inequality perceptions, self-reported ideology, and policy preferences.
One important feature of our paper is that we examine abortion, the death penalty, and gay rights, which are not usually considered to be related directly to economic inequality.
However, even though these issues are not related to economic inequality in a narrow sense, it does not follow that perceptions of economic inequality will have no effect. In considering these policy issues, we expect perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination to serve as a proxy for more general perceptions of inequality (i.e., those who perceive a world with greater economic inequality may also perceive greater inequalities in a variety of social relationships). Indeed, in many cases, our results support the hypothesis that perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination have important effects on policy preferences toward issues that are not narrowly economic.
We use data from a public-opinion survey of a random sample of the Michigan adult population to analyze preferences toward six policy issues: (1) cash payments for poor families, (2) military spending, (3) the power of corporations, (4) abortion, (5) the death penalty, and (6) the rights of gays and lesbians. Our empirical analysis shows that perceptions of income inequality and labor-market discrimination have significant effects in explaining the variation in preferences toward all of these policies, even when we control for political-party affiliation, selfreported ideology, and a large number of other covariates. These effects tend to be more important for issues on which the degree of political polarization is relatively small.
We measure ideology on the standard seven-point scale ranging from very liberal (coded as 1) to very conservative (coded as 7), with moderate coded as 4. Jacoby (2009) argues that citizens with different degrees of political sophistication tend to use liberal-conservative terms differently. Nevertheless, as Jacoby puts it, "political scientists have generally regarded ideology as a major influence on voting behavior… even though the psychological mechanisms underlying its impact may vary across strata within the mass public." For further discussion along these lines, see Schiffer (2000) and Stimson and Ellis (2012) . We use self-reported ideology because it is a standard control variable in this literature, and we discuss ideology at length because our analysis suggests that it has very different effects for different policy issues.
After we control for perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination, self-reported ideology does not have any significant effect on preferences toward cash payments for the poor, military spending, and the power of corporations. On the other hand, ideology plays a very significant role in explaining the variation in policy preferences toward abortion, the death penalty, and gay rights. These are the policies on which preferences are most polarized, in the sense that the variance of responses is largest. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) and others have demonstrated the increasing ideological polarization of the two major political parties in the U.S. since the early 1990s. Nivola and Brady (2006) and others point to redistricting, term limits, the rise of conservative ideology, and other influences that have fueled the rise in polarization. In light of the increasing importance of ideology, it is probably not surprising that ideology has a strong influence on preferences toward some policy issues. In our view, however, it is remarkable that ideology falls far short of significance in explaining preferences toward half of the policy issues that we consider. For the policy issues that are relatively highly polarized, self-reported ideology does have large and statistically significant effects. However, even for the more polarized issues, perceptions of income inequality and labor-market discrimination still have important effects in many cases.
FACTS AND PERCEPTIONS REGARDING ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION
One of the most striking trends of the last four decades in the United States has been the large increase in income inequality. Data compiled by Piketty and Saez (2003) show that the share of total income received by the top one percent of households increased from about 8% in 1980 to about 18% in recent years. (If we include capital gains, the increase is from about 9% to more than 20%.) The increase in household income inequality has been dominated by rising inequality in labor-market earnings. For economic analysis of the trend toward greater earnings inequality, see Bound and Johnson (1992) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) .
The empirical research conducted here is based on the responses to an opinion survey conducted in 2010. In one of the survey questions, we ask what happened to the income gap between high-income people and low-income people in the United States since 1980. A substantial majority answered (correctly) that the income gap has increased. However, about 16% of the respondents said that the gap has stayed about the same, and about 13% said it has decreased. These responses are remarkable, since the increase in income inequality has been so dramatic, and has received a great deal of attention. On the other hand, the lack of knowledge that we have found here is not unique to our survey. Public-opinion surveys have repeatedly shown that a substantial portion of the American public is poorly informed about many basic economic and demographic facts. For example, Americans tend to understate the relative size of the white population, and overstate the relative size of minority populations, often to an astonishing degree. Gallup and Newport (1990) report that "The average American thinks that America is 32% black, 21% Hispanic, and 18% Jewish. " Nadeau, Niemi, and Levine (1993) and Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz (2005) report similar findings. Also, the Kaiser Family Foundation (2013) found that the average American believes that 28 percent of the federal budget is spent on foreign aid, whereas the correct figure is about one percent. Finally, it should be noted that our results regarding changes in the income gap do not appear to be due to idiosyncratic responses to this particular survey. The same question was asked on another round of this survey of Michigan residents in early 2014, and the results were remarkably similar. Bartels (2005) We also focus on perceptions of the extent to which earnings differences by race and sex are due to labor-market discrimination. Black/white and male/female earnings differences are salient in the minds of many, and perceptions of the nature of these differences may have an important influence on preferences toward public policies. Accessible reviews of the literature on differences in labor-market outcomes by race and sex can be found in Blau and Kahn (2000) and Darity and Mason (1998) . This literature demonstrates that the wage gaps between men and women and between whites and blacks are considerably smaller than they were in the middle decades of the 20 th century, but that large differences still remain. Census data indicate that, for full-time, year-round workers, the ratio of median earnings for black males to median earnings for white males rose from about 71% in 1980 to about 80% in 2014 (see U.S. Census (2016), Tables P-38B and P-38W). The ratio of median earnings for women to median earnings for men rose from about 60% in 1980 to about 79% in 2014 (see U.S. Census (2016), Table P-38AR).
Thus the earnings gaps by race and sex have tended to decrease, even though overall earnings inequality has increased substantially. For further discussion, see Blau, Ferber, and Winkler (1998) .
Measuring an earnings gap is more straightforward than identifying the extent to which the gap is caused by labor-market discrimination or by other influences. In some cases, it has been possible to shed direct light on discrimination in the labor market, as in the study of orchestra auditions by Goldin and Rouse (2000) . They find that perhaps one-fourth to one-third of the increase in the number of female musicians at these orchestras can be attributed to the adoption of "blind" auditions, in which the sex of the auditioning musician is not observed by the judges. However, since it is difficult to perform controlled experiments in this area, those who wish to isolate the extent of discrimination must often resort to indirect methods of inference.
The consensus in the literature appears to be that discrimination against both women and minorities (like the earnings gaps themselves) has decreased over time, although not to zero. For example, Charles and Guryan (2008) conclude that 25% of the racial wage gap is due to discrimination.
Regardless of the actual amount of labor-market inequality and discrimination, numerous researchers have sought to understand how people perceive labor-market differences. For example, Antecol and Kuhn (2000) show that young women are much more likely to perceive discrimination than older women, and that the difference cannot be explained by observed personal or job characteristics. Kluegel and Smith (1982) suggest that people tend to underestimate the extent of discrimination felt by other groups. This applies especially to whites' perceptions of discrimination against black men.
The respondents to our survey express a wide variety of views regarding the relative importance of discrimination and job-skill differences in explaining the earnings gaps by race and sex. Some 30% of respondents said that black/white earnings differences are mostly due to skill differences, but 18% said these differences are mostly due to discrimination. About 23%
said that male/female earnings differences are mostly due to skill differences, while 25.5% said that these are mostly due to discrimination. We exploit this variation in perceptions in our empirical analysis.
POLITICAL-ECONOMY MODELS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INEQUALITY AND POLICY PREFERENCES
While much attention has been focused on the economic causes and consequences of inequality, several scholars have sought to understand the relationship between economic inequality and various political factors. For example, Bartels (2008) and Kelly (2005) show that the policies pursued by the major political parties have substantially different effects on economic inequality. (2012), Alesina and Glaeser (2004) , Bartels (2005 Bartels ( , 2008 , Edsall (1985) , and Frank (2004) have discussed a large number of channels through which economic inequality could be related to preferences and public policies.
In a recent empirical paper, Kelly and Enns (2010) find some support for the model of Bénabou (2000) . Their analysis suggests that "both the rich and the poor respond to rising inequality by shifting in a conservative direction." (For further discussion, see Luttig (2013) .) In our view, however, it is possible that the estimates of Kelly and Enns could suffer from omittedvariables bias, as well as reverse causality. Thus we do not believe that the direction of these relationships is a settled issue. In fact, some of our results provide support for the model of
Meltzer and Richard (1981)-we find that those who perceive that income inequality has increased are significantly more likely to support an increase in cash payments for the poor.
Kelly and Enns (2010) measure income inequality using the Gini coefficient for family money income. They then compare this to a measure of public opinion based on Stimson's (1999) public mood. However, as we have seen, the public often has imperfect information about actual levels of inequality. Therefore, we focus on perceptions of inequality.
DATA AND VARIABLES
Our dataset is created from a survey of 979 Michigan adults, ranging in age from 18 to 92, conducted in May, June, and July 2010 by Michigan State University's State of the State Survey (SOSS). This survey, which was established in 1994, has provided the data for a large number of published papers, including Davis and Silver (2003) , Kaplowitz, Broman, and Fisher (2006) , and Skidmore, Ballard, and Hodge (2010) . The respondents to this survey are a random sample of the Michigan adult population. We believe that evidence from Michigan is of genuine interest in its own right. Moreover, the characteristics of the Michigan population are sufficiently similar to national averages for us to suggest that it may be possible to generalize our results to the broader American population. This would be an interesting avenue for future research.
Our questions on SOSS allow us to operationalize the measures of public-policy preferences and perceptions of economic inequality and discrimination discussed above. Discrimination: This variable is created from two survey questions. The first question begins by stating that black men earn less in the labor market than white men, on average, and then asks respondents whether they believe this difference is due to differences in job skills or to discrimination. The second question begins by stating that a similar wage gap exists between women and men, and then asks respondents whether they believe this difference is due to job skills or discrimination. For both questions, the response options are: mostly to differences in skills; somewhat more to the differences in skills than to discrimination; somewhat more to discrimination than to skills; and mostly to discrimination. Respondents were also allowed to volunteer that both factors mattered about equally. Discrimination takes on the average value of the coded responses from these two questions.
Escape Poverty: This question asks for the respondent's opinion about the chances for a person from a poor background to get out of poverty, if he/she is willing to work hard. The response options are that his/her chances are excellent, good, fair, not very good, or poor.
In Table 3 , we summarize the responses for these perception variables, as well as political-party affiliation and ideology. Table 3 demonstrates that the responses to our perception questions show a great deal of variation. This variation is consistent with the results from previous studies of perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination (described above), many of which reveal considerable heterogeneity in perceptions.
<Table 3 here> POLARIZATION
We seek to compare the effects on policy preferences of (1) perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination, and (2) self-reported ideology. We expect that the effect of these influences will depend on the degree of polarization of the policy variable that is to be explained. (Here, when we say "degree of polarization", we are referring to the degree of variation in the responses regarding particular policy issues, rather than to the broad environment of political polarization.) Specifically, for issues that are more polarized ideologically, we hypothesize that self-reported ideology will play a relatively more substantial role.
We use the standard deviation of responses as a measure of polarization. In our data, we find considerable variation in the degree of polarization of responses across our policy- smaller for the iPOLL data than for our surveys, but this smaller variance is due in part to the fact that the national polls offered only three or four response options, while our surveys offered five. We interpret the consistency in the relative magnitudes of the standard deviation as evidence that the observed patterns of preferences and polarization across issues in our survey can be generalized to the broader population.
RESULTS
We report the results from several OLS regressions in Tables 4-7 . 1 The dependent variables are the responses to the policy-preference questions. The key independent variables are our measures of perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination, as well as self-reported ideology and political-party affiliation. Table 4 shows the results for Cash Payments for Poor Families (the least polarized issue), and Tables 5 and 6 show the results for Abortion and Gay and Lesbian Rights, which are two of the most polarized issues. For each issue, we first present a regression analysis in which the only regressors are demographic characteristics and perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labormarket discrimination. We then run the regression a second time, excluding perceptions of inequality, mobility, and discrimination, while including partisanship and self-reported ideology.
The third regression includes all of the independent variables. else equal, those who perceive that the increases in income inequality have been larger are more likely to believe that spending on the poor is too low. Finally, in a result that is very consistent with the findings of Alesina and Glaeser (2004) , the positive and significant effect of Escape Poverty indicates that those who believe the poor have few opportunities to escape poverty through hard work are more likely to believe that cash payments for the poor are too low.
<Table 4 here>
The magnitudes of these three coefficients are between 0.1 and 0.2. This means that, holding constant all other influences, a one-point increase in Discrimination, Change in Income Inequality, or Escape Poverty (each of which is scaled from 1 to 5) is associated with an increase of about 0.1 or 0.2 in the favorability with which the respondent views cash payments to poor families (where the dependent variable is also scaled from 1 to 5). We characterize this as an effect of moderate size, which is estimated fairly precisely.
In the second column of Table 4 , we include self-reported ideology and political-party identification as regressors, in addition to the demographic characteristics, while excluding perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination. None of the ideology or partisanship variables is statistically significant. Thus self-reported ideology plays relatively little role in explaining policy preferences toward spending on poor families, which is the least polarized of our policy-preference variables.
In the last column of Table 4 , we include all of the independent variables, including perceptions of income inequality, labor-market discrimination, and economic mobility, as well as ideology, partisanship, and demographics. In this full model, the perceptions of income inequality, labor-market discrimination, and economic mobility remain strong and significant (as in the first specification), while ideology and partisanship remain insignificant (as in the second specification). In other words, in the full model in the last column of Table 4 , perceptions of income inequality, labor-market discrimination, and economic mobility play an important role in explaining preferences for spending on the poor, but ideology does not. Some of the demographic variables are statistically significant as well. For example, in the full model, we see that women are substantially more likely than men to believe that cash payments for the poor are too low, even after controlling for other influences. Table 5 shows the regression results for Abortion. We have scaled this variable so that a higher value indicates greater support for legal abortion. Since abortion is one of the more highly polarized issues we consider, we expect that ideology and partisanship will have an effect on policy preferences. When self-reported ideology and partisanship are not included in the model, as shown in the first column of results in Table 5 , all of the coefficients for the inequality and discrimination perception variables are positively signed. However, only the effect of Escape Poverty is statistically significant. By contrast, the second column of results in Table 5 shows that the effects of ideology and partisanship are both strong and significant.
Conservatives are substantially less likely to favor abortion rights, and Democrats are much more likely than Republicans to favor abortion rights. These patterns continue to hold in the full model in column 3 of Table 5 .
<Table 5 here> Table 6 shows the regression results for Gay and Lesbian Rights, which is scaled so that a higher value indicates greater support for gay rights. The responses to the gay-rights question have a higher standard deviation than the responses for any of the other issues that we consider, which we interpret as meaning that this issue is relatively highly polarized. Thus we expect that self-reported ideology will have an effect on policy preferences in this case. The second column
of results in Table 6 shows that the effects of ideology and partisanship are both strong and significant, with conservatives less likely to favor gay rights, and Democrats much more likely than Republicans to favor gay rights. These patterns continue to hold in the full model in column 3 of Table 6 .
<Table 6 here>
Although we expect ideology to play a more prominent role in explaining policy preferences for a highly polarized policy such as gay rights, this does not necessarily mean that perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination will not have any effects. Those who perceive a large degree of discrimination against blacks or women in the labor market may also be more likely to think of gays and lesbians as victims of discrimination. Indeed, as shown in the third column of results in Table 6 , perceptions of labormarket discrimination have an effect on policy preferences regarding gay rights that is significant at the 10-percent level, even after we control for ideology. Also, perceptions of whether poor people are able to escape poverty have a significant effect on policy preferences regarding gay rights, even after controlling for ideology.
Next, we consider the overall pattern of results for all six of our policy-preference variables. The results are shown in Table 7 , in which the issues are ordered from lowest to highest variance. Each row of Table 7 shows selected OLS coefficients for a particular regression equation. For each of the dependent variables, specification A includes the variables representing perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination, plus controls. Specification B includes self-reported ideology political-party affiliation plus controls, and specification C includes all of the independent variables.
<Table 7 here>
As shown in Table 7 for the full specification C, all three of our variables regarding perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination play a statistically significant role in explaining the variation in preferences toward Cash Payments for the Poor Families. Two of the three are significant in explaining Military Spending, and two of the three are significant in explaining Power of Corporations. On the other hand, Ideology does not have a significant effect on preferences toward any of these three policy issues.
However, the effect of Ideology is strong and significant for Abortion, Death Penalty, and
Gay and Lesbian Rights. In addition, two of the variables regarding perceptions of economic inequality and discrimination have significant effects in the regressions for these more-polarized policies, even after we control for ideology and partisanship. Specifically, the belief that the poor cannot easily escape poverty has significant effects on preferences regarding Abortion and
Gay and Lesbian Rights. Perceptions of labor-market discrimination are significantly related to policy preferences for Death Penalty and Gay and Lesbian Rights, even when we control for ideology and partisanship. As mentioned earlier, some respondents may see gay rights as an issue of discrimination. Some may also see capital punishment in the same light, due to the wellpublicized racial disparities in the use of the death penalty. (For example, see Zeisel (1981) .)
The broad patterns shown in Table 7 indicate that, when polarization on an issue is low, perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination have important effects on policy preferences, even when we control for ideology and partisanship. On the issues with lower polarization, ideology has no significant effects. Ideology and partisanship play an important and statistically significant role in explaining policy preferences when polarization is high, and perceptions of economic mobility and labor-market discrimination also have significant effects on the more-polarized variables in some cases.
Endogeneity
Throughout the discussion thus far, we have assumed implicitly that Discrimination, Change in Income Inequality, and Escape Poverty are exogenous to policy preferences. However, we acknowledge the possibility that these variables are potentially endogenous, i.e., that the implied causal relationship between perceptions of inequality/discrimination/mobility and policy preferences is reversed. To test the assumption of exogeneity, we have performed a series of tests using the procedure of Hausman (1978 Hausman ( , 1983 .
The results of the Hausman tests (which are available on request) show that there is no apparent endogeneity in our analyses of policy preferences for cash payments for the poor, the power of corporations, and gay rights. In the Hausman tests for military spending, abortion, and the death penalty, at least one of our instruments produces a test statistic that is statistically significant, indicating that endogeneity may be an issue. We interpret the results for the Hausman tests as suggesting that endogeneity is not an overwhelming problem, but also that we should be careful not to overstate the extent to which the relationships uncovered here are causal.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the role of perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labor-market discrimination in explaining preferences regarding a wide variety of public policies.
We test our hypotheses with data from a survey of 979 Michigan adults. The survey contains questions about preferences regarding cash payments for the poor, military spending, the power of corporations, abortion, gay rights, and the death penalty. It also includes questions about respondents' perceptions of the extent and sources of inequality in various economic relationships, as well as self-reported ideology, political-party identification, and personal characteristics.
Our results indicate that perceptions of income inequality, economic mobility, and labormarket discrimination have important and significant effects on policy preferences, even after controlling for self-reported ideology and party affiliation. For the less-polarized policypreference variables (cash payments for the poor, military spending, and the power of corporations), ideology does not have significant effects. For the more highly polarized variables, self-reported ideology has effects that are large and statistically significant, although perceptions of labor-market discrimination and economic mobility still have important effects in many cases. Specifically, perceptions of economic mobility have important and statistically significant effects on preferences regarding abortion and gay rights, even after we control for ideology and political-party affiliation. Perceptions of labor-market discrimination have substantial and significant effects on preferences toward the death penalty and gay rights, even after controlling for ideology and party. This demonstrates that perceptions of economic inequality and its sources have very wide-ranging effects on policy preferences, even for policy issues that are not considered primarily in economic terms, and even after controlling for ideology. 10.4 $30k-$40k 9.1 $40k-$50k 10.2 $50k-$60k 8.2 $60k-$70k 9.7 $70k-$90k 15.9 $90k-$100k 2.4 $100k-$150k 11.6 Above $150k 10.0 a Significance levels are indicated as: *=10%, **=5%, and *** =1%.
